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Complex Experimental Federalism
DONI GEWIRTZMAN†
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the argument made its Supreme Court debut
in 1932,1 scholars,2 politicians,3 and judges from across the
† Professor of Law, New York Law School. This Article has benefitted from
conversations with and feedback from James Grimmelmann, David Johnson,
Molly Land, Ed Purcell, and Rebecca Roiphe, invaluable research assistance from
Michael Roffer, as well as input from the participants in the American
Constitution Society’s Constitutional Law Schmooze, faculty workshops at Seton
Hall Law School and New York Law School, and Erin Connare and her team at
the Buffalo Law Review.
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). While the central claim is usually attributed to Justice Brandeis,
arguments for experimentalism date back to at least the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (referencing states as “insulated chambers” that conduct “social
experiments”); JAMES VISCOUNT BRYCE, 1 THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 468
(1888) (“Federalism enables a people to try experiments in legislation and
administration which could not be safely tried in a large centralized country. A
comparatively small commonwealth like an American State easily makes and
unmakes its laws; mistakes are not serious, for they are soon corrected; other
States profit by the experience of a law or a method which has worked well or ill
in the State that has tried it.”); MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN
CONSTITUTION 253-54 (2012) (quoting Brandeis letter from 1912 endorsing state
experimentation).
2. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation,
112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60-61 (1998); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1499 (1994); see generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel,
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
3. See, e.g., CQ Transcripts Wire, Obama Remarks Before Meeting with
Governors, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2008, 12:08 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/02/AR2008120201486.html (President-elect
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ideological spectrum4 have celebrated federalism as a
structure for policy experimentation and innovation. The
idea, as Justice Louis Brandeis explained it, is that
“courageous”5 states will try out their own ways of solving
policy problems. Then, as these policy laboratories
experiment with different approaches, other states 6 and the
federal government7 can copy or improve upon the best
solutions.
Obama praising the ability of a state to “serve as a laboratory experimenting with
innovative solutions to our economic problems. . . . [T]hat’s the spirit that I want
to reclaim for the country as a whole. One where states are testing ideas, where
Washington is investing in what works . . .”).
4. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 869, 902-03 (2010) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 170-71 (2009); Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer
v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 71 (2005); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 327 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 664 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 324 (1997) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting); U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 600-01 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1008-09 (1991); Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring);
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985); Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980). Lower court judges have invoked
Brandeis’s theory as well. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
597 F.3d 163, 187 (4th Cir. 2010) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (substantive due
process); Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 389 (4th Cir. 2009) (First Amendment);
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of America v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 85 (1st Cir. 2001)
(dormant Commerce Clause); see also Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard
States: Federalism and Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1752-76
(2004).
5. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION
AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES (2007); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry,
State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990).
7. See Keith Boeckelman, The Influence of States on Federal Policy Adoptions,
20 POL’Y STUD. J. 365 (1992); Earl M. Maltz, The Impact of the Constitutional
Revolution of 1937 on the Dormant Commerce Clause—A Case Study in the
Decline of State Autonomy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 127-28 (1995); Karen
Mossberger, State-Federal Diffusion and Policy Learning: From Enterprise Zones
to Empowerment Zones, 29 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 31 (1999); Carol S. Weissert
& Daniel Scheller, Learning from the States? Federalism and National Health
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The result, according to federalism’s biggest fans, is a
system that generates more efficient and effective
policymaking than a single policy imposed from above by a
centralized government.8 They argue collective learning
happens faster if fifty states are simultaneously trying to
solve a problem; federalist systems acquire more
information, process it faster, and offer conclusions that are
collectively more accurate than a single experiment
conducted by a centralized national government. 9 Moreover,
federalist systems are better equipped to contain the risk of
failed policy experiments, since the costs of policy failure are
visited only upon the experimenting state rather than the
nation as a whole.10
And yet, despite the enduring survival of this normative
claim, constitutional theory has been surprisingly
uninterested in the down and dirty mechanics of
experimental federalism.11 Instead, theorists have been
Policy, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. S162 (2008). But see David Lowery et al., Policy
Attention in State and Nation: Is Anyone Listening to the Laboratories of
Democracy?, 41 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 286, 286 (2010) (finding “little evidence”
that changes in state policy agendas influence national policy agendas).
8. See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in
Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1233-36 (1994).
9. See Dorf, supra note 2, at 60-61; Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both
Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on Renewable
Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 434-36 (2008).
10. See JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 31
(2009) [hereinafter BEDNAR, ROBUST FEDERATION]; Jenna Bednar, Nudging
Federalism Towards Productive Experimentation, 21 REGIONAL & FED. STUD. 503
(2011) [hereinafter Bednar, Nudging Federalism]; Dorf, supra note 2, at 60. For
other arguments supporting experimental federalism, see, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 87-88 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:
Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498 (1987), arguing
that subsidiary policy-making units are more likely to have preferences that
depart from the national mean, and are more likely to experiment with policies
that a national majority would reject, and Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism
and the Life-Cycle of Moral Progress, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385, 1387-89 (2005);
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 276 (1977), arguing that federalism allows the
legal system to harness the experimental benefits of competition.
11. See GREVE, supra note 1, at 195; Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82
MINN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1997). Indeed, the idea that federalism produces
experimentation and innovation is not a foregone conclusion. See DANIEL
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focused almost entirely on the relationship between
experimentation and vertical federalism, preoccupied with
whether the benefits from those experiments justify the cost
and inefficiency that results from maintaining fifty state
governments,12 or whether a commitment to experimentalism
has any real use in resolving difficult constitutional disputes
about the scope of individual liberties or the allocation of
power between federal and state governments.13
This Article engages experimental federalism from a
different perspective, putting aside well-worn debates about
whether “Our Federalism”14 is really worth all the trouble.
Whether we like it or not, federalism is here to stay as a core
element of our constitutional system. The proper focus, as
Robert Schapiro puts it, “is not ‘why federalism,’ but how
federalism should best operate.” 15 Indeed, the need to
improve federalism’s experimental capacity has taken on
new relevance in an era marked by unprecedented political
gridlock in Washington.16 When federal inaction creates a
policy vacuum, state policy experimentation may be the only
available solution for solving difficult social problems. 17
Moreover, as political impasse removes the threat of any
TREISMAN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF GOVERNMENT: RETHINKING POLITICAL
DECENTRALIZATION 229-35 (2007); Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Political
Decentralization and Policy Experimentation, 4 Q. J. POL. SCI. 35, 53 (2009).
12. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 924-26 (1994).
13. See BRYCE, supra note 1, at 165-68. For other critiques of experimental
federalism, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does
Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980).
14. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
15. ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 6 (2009); see also Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1680 (2014) (arguing that regardless of whether
experimentation is desirable, “states will continue experimenting, and we must
make this experimentation as effective as possible.”).
16. See J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cynthia J. Bowling, Polarized Parties, Politics,
and Policies: Fragmented Federalism in 2013-2014, 44 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM
369, 371-72 (2014).
17. See KARCH, supra note 6, at 15 (2007); S. Karthick Ramakrishnan &
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in Immigration
Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431, 1437-39 (2012).
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organized federal response, state governments are steadily
expanding their experimental sphere into areas that overlap
with federal authority, like immigration and medical
marijuana.18
This shift in approach brings a different set of questions
to the forefront. A meaningful theory of how experimental
federalism works seeks to identify the traits that allow
decentralized systems to innovate effectively, asks whether
our current system contains those traits, and recommends
changes to existing constitutional structures and doctrine
that would help our current system come closer to the ideal.19
Given the inevitability of federalism as a core element of our
constitutional order, how should we design constitutional
institutions and doctrinal rules to help the system achieve its
experimental potential? How can we structure an
environment where states do interesting things,20 and where
those choices can benefit their citizens, other states, the
nation, and the world? How can these design features help
preserve federalism’s experimental benefits regardless of
federal or state budget constraints, the political climate,
demographic shifts, or who is currently winning the debate
over “states’ rights” at any given moment?
This Article begins to address these questions by offering
a framework for thinking about how experimental federalism
works. It uses complex systems theory, an analytic lens that
has started to gain some traction within constitutional
scholarship over the last five years,21 to examine how certain
18. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as
Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673 (2011); Sam Kamin,
Cooperative Federalism and State Marijuana Regulation, 85 U. COLO. L. REV.
1105, 1106-12 (2014); Pickerill & Bowling, supra note 16, at 369-72.
19. Dorf and Sabel come closest to this ideal, but only deal with federalism in
a small portion of their work. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 419-38.
20. See SCOTT E. PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY 10 (2011) [hereinafter PAGE,
DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY].
21. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION (2011); Jenna
Bednar, Subsidiarity and Robustness: Building the Adaptive Efficiency of Legal
Systems, in NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 231 (James E. Fleming &
Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014) [hereinafter Bednar, Subsidiarity and Robustness];
Jenna Bednar, The Political Science of Federalism, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 269
(2011) [hereinafter Bednar, Political Science of Federalism]; Doni Gewirtzman,
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kinds of decentralized systems work and thrive. When
systems are composed of many parts, those parts interact
with one another and give the system traits that cannot be
predicted simply by looking at the individual characteristics
of the system’s components.22 For example, it is impossible to
fully describe or predict behavior in our constitutional system
simply by looking at a set of Supreme Court cases that
interpret the Constitution. Instead, the system’s traits are
defined by countless interactions between executive,
legislative, and judicial actors on the federal and state level
operating within the constraints of different legal rules.
Complex systems analysis is an effort to understand how
those interactions work, and the “system-level” macroscopic
behavior that they generate.23
Systems theory suggests that Brandeis’s experimental
vision for federalism depends heavily on two underexplored
concepts in constitutional theory: heterogeneity and
interdependence.24 Heterogeneity refers to the extent to
Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive
System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457 (2012); Jenna Bednar, Constitutional Systems
Theory: A Research Agenda Motivated by Vermeule, The System of the
Constitution, and Epstein, Design for Liberty, 48 TULSA L. REV. 325 (2012) (book
review); Garrick B. Pursley, Properties in Constitutional Systems: Reviewing
Adrian Vermeule, The System of the Constitution, 92 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2014)
(book review); cf. Barbara A. Cherry, The Telecommunications Economy and
Regulation as Coevolving Complex Adaptive Systems: Implications for
Federalism, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 369 (2007); David G. Post & David R. Johnson,
“Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Towards a New Theory of Decentralized
Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998).
22. See J.B. Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk in Legal Systems, 89 IND. L.J. 559,
567-68 (2014) [hereinafter Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk].
23. Id.
24. See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796,
1822 (2008) (“Remarkably little attention has been paid to the importance of
differences among the states.”); Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political
Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 59 (2014) (“[C]ourts
and scholars have neglected federalism’s horizontal dimensions.”). If anything,
state heterogeneity has been roundly dismissed by contemporary federalism
scholars who argue that state-level identification is an obsolete concept for most
Americans. See SCHAPIRO, supra note 15, at 7 (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1109-12 (2014) [hereinafter
Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism]; Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism

2015] COMPLEX EXPERIMENTAL FEDERALISM

247

which a system’s components contain different material
traits. Interdependence refers to the extent to which choices
made by one component materially affect the behavior of
others within the system. Systems made up of components
that are different from one another will experiment
differently than systems whose parts approach problems in
the same way.25 Similarly, systems whose parts share a lot of
information with one another will approach experimentation
differently than systems whose parts work in relative
isolation.26 This does not mean that more heterogeneity and
more interdependence leads to more and better innovation:
only that these two variables help to determine whether
experimental federalism lives up to its hype. In turn,
federalism’s capacity for innovation and experimentation is
not an inevitable outcome of decentralization and policy
devolution, but is instead contingent on social and political
forces that bring states closer together or further apart.
The overall goal here is limited in scope: to examine
experimental federalism through complexity’s lens and to
begin fully accounting for the ways that heterogeneity and
interdependence affect the system’s performance. Part I
positions federalism as a “complex adaptive system”
composed of fifty semi-autonomous decision-making bodies
that operate with significant degrees of independence. As a
complex system, federalism’s experimental output is an
emergent feature of the system that is dependent on the
system’s levels of heterogeneity and interdependence. These
two critical variables, in turn, help position the system on a
continuum between randomness and rigidity, helping the
system arrive at a “sweet spot” that allows for both stability
and adaptation.
Part II explores the concept of heterogeneity, and
examines how heterogeneity affects the quality and quantity
of federalism’s experimental output. It catalogs the ways that
variation in state policy approaches can help the system
overcome certain obstacles to effective problem-solving—
bounded rationality, free-riding, premature convergence, and
All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16-17 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken,
Foreword: Federalism].
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.
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cartelization. At the same time, it shows that diversity can
increase
the
information
costs
associated
with
experimentation, while also inhibiting the system’s ability to
internalize the benefits of certain kinds of beneficial policy
experiments.
Part III examines the concept of interdependence, and
the ways that informational links between states change the
system’s emergent experimental approach. In particular, it
suggests that stronger informational ties between nodes in a
network tend to push the system towards exploiting existing
information and policies, while weaker ties tend to bias the
system towards the exploration of new solutions and the
accumulation of new information.
I. FEDERALISM AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM
Complexity science is the study of “structural interagent
dependencies and the system-wide effects they produce.” 27
This Part provides a brief overview of three concepts that are
critical to understanding how “complex adaptive systems”
like federalism work: emergence, heterogeneity, and
interdependence. It then explores how complex systems
optimize their performance so that they are able to survive
and adapt to changes in their environment and the ways that
complexity can improve our understanding of experimental
federalism.
A. Emergence
State-level policy experimentation is complicated.28 Any
attempt to describe whether and how states choose to
experiment must account for the decentralized behavior and
decision-making of thousands of federal, state, and local
elected officials, administrative offices, political parties, and

27. Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk, supra note 22, at 566.
28. See JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 9 (Simon A. Levin &
Steven Strogatz eds., 2007) (describing the distinction between “complicated” and
“complex”).
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interest groups.29 Moreover, these actors interact with one
another within and across state borders and work within a
dynamic environment filled with unexpected political, social,
legal, and economic changes that affect policy decisions and
outcomes. It is therefore impossible to understand
experimental federalism in a real way without situating it in
the context of a larger political system comprised of countless
intra- and inter-state interactions.30
When trying to understand “complicated worlds,” the
standard scientific approach involves breaking the
environment down into its component parts and trying to
understand each one. If you want to understand the atom,
break it down into electrons and sub-particles—by
understanding and aggregating the parts, you can
understand the whole.31
Constitutional theory has its own version of the standard
scientific approach. This method involves examining the
behavior of individual constitutional actors and drawing
conclusions about larger institutions based on insights about
those individuals. For example, a theorist will attempt to
understand how individual Supreme Court justices behave
and will then draw conclusions about how the Court
functions by aggregating their individual behavior.32
The problem with this standard approach, in both science
and constitutional theory, is that many natural and social
systems exhibit emergent behavior: these systems have
characteristics that may not be present in any of their
components, and the whole may look very different than the
sum of its parts.33 Instead, the system’s behavior is altered by
interactions between the components, and the larger whole
29. See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1679-81.
30. See Bednar, Nudging Federalism, supra note 10, at 503-09.
31. Pursley, supra note 21, at 548-49.
32. See Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2009).
33. See ROBERT AXELROD & MICHAEL D. COHEN, HARNESSING COMPLEXITY:
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER 15 (Basic Books 2000)
(2000); J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 894
(2008) [hereinafter Ruhl, Law’s Complexity].
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contains characteristics, features, and a larger order that are
more than simply an aggregation of the system’s parts.34 Like
a mosaic, it is impossible to understand the full picture
simply by looking at the average tile, or even at each
individual tile.35
The desire to understand and account for emergent
behavior led natural and social scientists to begin exploring
how “complex systems” work. Complex systems are “dynamic
environments that contain multiple actors who interact with
one another.”36 A system becomes more “complex” when the
interactions among the system’s “agents” become more
important to defining the system’s behavior.37
Despite their decentralized nature and emergent
features, many complex systems prove remarkably resilient
in their ability to adapt to change while maintaining their
core features.38 Financial markets, ecosystems, ant colonies,
and social networks are all examples of “complex adaptive
systems” that achieve some level of stability and order
without any centralized direction.
Legal systems, with their countless interactions among
interrelated institutions, legal actors, and rules, are rife with
emergent behavior.39 Accordingly, scholars from a wide range
of legal disciplines, including constitutional law, 40 have begun
to look for emergent features in legal systems and to use
complexity to better explain how those systems work and
improve the performance of legal institutions.41

34. See MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 12-13 (2009).
35. See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 28, at 44-45.
36. Scott E. Page, Uncertainty, Difficulty, and Complexity, 20 J. THEORETICAL
POL. 115, 117 (2008).
37. See Ruhl, Law’s Complexity, supra note 33, at 891.
38. See MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 13.
39. See Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk, supra note 22, at 568 (“Emergen[t
behavior] permeates legal systems.”).
40. See Vermeule, supra note 32, at 36-37.
41. See Ruhl, Law’s Complexity, supra note 33, at 909-11.
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B. Heterogeneity and Interdependence
Emergence in complex systems is driven by two
interrelated variables: heterogeneity (the level of variation of
certain key characteristics and behaviors among the system’s
components) and interdependence (the way the components
interact with one another and alter each other’s behavior).42
Heterogeneity drives emergent behavior by creating
similarities and differences in how a system’s components
respond to different stimuli, producing system-level effects.43
For example, consider the well-documented phenomenon of
“panel effects,” where the impact of judicial ideology is
dampened when a three-judge panel is composed of
ideologically heterogeneous judges appointed by both
Republicans and Democrats.44 Yet, as Heather Gerken points
out, a system composed entirely of internally heterogeneous
panels will produce a similar set of decisions at the system
level as the ideological differences between panels become
less significant—heterogeneity among the components, in
this case, produces more homogenous system-level
outcomes.45
Interdependence creates emergence through the
connections between the system’s components; as each one
acts, its choices affect the behavior of other components. For
example, consider the effects of interdependence on group
decision-making (known as group polarization). A group
composed entirely of members with the same viewpoint will
produce outcomes that are more ideologically extreme than
the views held by any member of the group due to the
interactions among group members.46 In that case,
interdependence produces a system-level outcome that
42. See AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 33, at 32-116; PAGE, DIVERSITY AND
COMPLEXITY, supra note 20, at 17, 25; Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity
of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1156-57 (2014).
43. See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 28, at 238-39; PAGE, DIVERSITY
COMPLEXITY, supra note 20, at 17-18.

AND

44. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 166-68 (2003).
45. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099,
1192-93 (2005) [hereinafter Gerken, Second-Order Diversity].
46. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 111.
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differs significantly from the outcome desired by the average
group member.
C. Optimal Performance for Complex Systems
Complex systems can be risky and fragile enterprises. 47
Since they are often composed of independent, autonomous
agents with no centralized mechanism to coordinate the
behavior of the individual components, they can fall apart or
degenerate into chaos.48 Moreover, when a system’s
components are highly interdependent, a change in a single
component can reverberate throughout the entire system,
making the system’s behavior highly unpredictable and
volatile (often referred to as the “butterfly effect”).49 Finally,
complexity can make the system’s behavior more difficult to
predict, and make it more challenging to determine cause
and effect when trying to assess or manipulate the system’s
behavior.50
Yet, despite their highly decentralized structure,
complex adaptive systems can exhibit considerable stability
and order over time. 51 They can be robust in the face of
change, maintaining their structure and continuing to
function despite changes in their environment. 52 These
systems achieve their robustness through redundancy and
feedback: they have many interdependent components that
replicate each others’ functions when one component fails,
and the components send signals to one another to respond
to systemic threats.53
47. See Niall Ferguson, Complexity and Collapse: Empires on the Edge of
Chaos, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 18 (2010); Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk, supra note 22,
at 587-92.
48. See STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH
LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 73-74, 90-91 (1995).

FOR THE

49. See Daniel A. Leventhal & Massimo Warglien, Landscape Design:
Designing for Local Action in Complex Worlds, 10 ORG. SCI. 342, 343-45 (1999).
50. See Ruhl, Law’s Complexity, supra note 33, at 901-04.
51. See AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 33, at 9-10; PAGE, DIVERSITY
COMPLEXITY, supra note 20, at 26.
52. See Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk, supra note 22, at 570-75.
53. See Bednar, Subsidarity and Robustness, supra note 21.

AND

2015] COMPLEX EXPERIMENTAL FEDERALISM

253

At the same time, they can also adapt when confronted
by disruptive environmental forces.54 This adaptive quality is
a partial function of heterogeneity among the system’s
components, which allow the system to simultaneously
explore multiple strategies for surviving environmental
shifts.55 Complex systems also adapt through interdependent
feedback mechanisms, which allow the system’s components
to gather information about their interactions with other
system components or the larger environment and make
changes to improve performance.56
As some have described it, complex adaptive systems
achieve optimal performance by operating on the “edge of
chaos” in a “sweet spot” between rigidity and randomness. 57
Systems that are too robust and rigid run the risk of
obsolescence because they are unable to adapt to change. 58 At
the same time, systems whose components are too responsive
to change risk chaos and disintegration.59
As drivers of emergent behavior, heterogeneity and
interdependence are critical to helping complex adaptive
systems achieve an optimal “compromise between

54. See J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive
Capacity in Legal Systems—With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89
N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1374-76 (2011).
55. See AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 33, at 108; MILLER & PAGE, supra note
28, at 29; Gewirtzman, supra note 21, at 509-11; Gregory Todd Jones,
Sustainability, Complexity, and the Negotiation of Constraint, 44 TULSA L. REV.
29, 38 (2008).
56. See Pursley, supra note 21, at 562-63.
57. See, e.g., KAUFFMAN, supra note 48, at 86; PAGE, DIVERSITY AND
COMPLEXITY, supra note 20, at 32; Ysanne Carlisle & Elizabeth McMillan,
Innovation in Organizations from a Complex Systems Perspective, 8 EMERGENCE
2 (2006); Chris Langton, Computation at the Edge of Chaos: Phase Transitions
and Emergent Computation, 42 PHYSICA D 12 (1990); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of
Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and
its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1418 (1996)
[hereinafter Ruhl, The Fitness of Law]; see also Ralph Stacey, Strategy as Order
Emerging from Chaos, 26 LONG RANGE PLANNING 10, 10-17 (1993).
58. See Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 57, at 1442.
59. See Gewirtzman, supra note 21, at 508.
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malleability and stability.”60 When states within a federalist
system differ from one another in meaningful ways, the
system is more likely to discover a policy approach that
allows it to adapt and survive a political, social, or economic
shift.61 Moreover, if the states are at least somewhat
interdependent, those adaptive experiments can easily
“diffuse” to other states without any expenditure of resources
by the federal government.62
At the same time, high levels of heterogeneity and
interdependence can move a system dangerously close to
randomness and chaos. A highly heterogeneous federalist
system may lack the redundancy and shared culture
necessary to retain its structural integrity in the face of
change: high levels of interdependence can make the system
prone to volatility as a change in one component can have
major effects on others. As a result, it is important to think
of heterogeneity and interdependence not as uniformly
positive features within a system, but as critical engines for
experimental federalism’s emergent behavior.

60. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 48, at 73, 80-81, 85; see also David J. Gerber,
Method, Community, & Comparative Law: An Encounter with Complexity
Science, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 110, 113-14 (2011).
61. See Gewirtzman, supra note 21, at 510-11.
62. For studies examining the diffusion of state policy experiments to other
states, see, e.g., Berry & Berry, supra note 6; Virginia Gray, Innovation in the
States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1174 (1973); Charles R. Shipan
& Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840
(2008) [hereinafter Shipan & Volden, Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion]; Craig
Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children’s Health
Insurance Program, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 294 (2006); Jack L. Walker, The
Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880
(1969). Discussions of policy diffusion have slowly begun to find their way into the
law review literature. See, e.g., Michael Burger, Policy Diffusion and the
(Re)Federalization of Fracking Regulation, 2013 MICH ST. L. REV. 1483
(forthcoming 2014); Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy?
Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333 (2009);
Wiseman, supra note 15; Katerina Linos, Note, When Do Policy Innovations
Spread? Lessons for Advocates of Lesson-Drawing, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1467 (2006).
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D. Complex Systems and Experimental Federalism
Federalism bears all the hallmarks of a complex adaptive
system.63 Decentralized and dispersed governmental
authority adds complexity and emergent potential to
constitutional systems64 by introducing new types of
heterogeneity and interdependence. As a common structural
solution for nation-states with diverse populations,
federalism injects heterogeneity into the system by breaking
a nation-state into subsidiary decision-making units that are
often very different from one another.65 Then, as states
interact with one another, federalism creates new forms of
interdependence. States share information, cooperate, and
compete with each other,66 altering each other’s behavior like
opposing players in a chess match.
The rest of this Article is an effort to explore how
heterogeneity and interdependence among states affects the
system’s experimental output and its ability to hit the
experimental “sweet spot” that allows for a simultaneous
commitment to both continuity and change.67 Like dials on an
Etch-a-Sketch, heterogeneity and interdependence drive
emergence and help position experimental federalism on a
continuum between rigidity and randomness, enabling the
system to maintain its robustness without losing its ability
to adapt.

63. Bednar, Nudging Federalism, supra note 10; Bednar, Political Science of
Federalism, supra note 21, at 280 (“the complexities of federalism, in going from
design to potential, require systems-level analysis.”); Bednar, Subsidiarity and
Robustness, supra note 21, at 235 (“Federalism adds complexity to a democratic
governmental system.”); Post & Johnson, supra note 21, at 1059.
64. See Bednar, Subsidiarity and Robustness, supra note 21, at 235
(“Federalism adds complexity to a democratic governmental system.”).
65. See Dawn Brancati, Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the
Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?, 60 INT’L ORG. 651, 681 (2006) (study
concluding that decentralization is a “useful mechanism in reducing both ethnic
conflict and secessionism.”).
66. See David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Governing Networks:
Telecommunication Deregulation in Europe and the United States, 27 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 819, 826-36 (2002).
67. See Carlisle & McMillan, supra note 57.
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There is one important caveat in thinking about
complexity and federalism. Unlike many complex systems
that operate with no central control and are entirely selforganizing,68 federalism allows for centralized direction in
the form of preemption or other efforts by the federal
government to create national uniformity or to manipulate
state policies in one direction or another. Yet even when
complex systems are not fully self-organizing, “hierarchy
serves as a kind of scaffolding” for complex behavior and
emergence.69 Even in policy areas where states operate with
clear federal mandates, state governments can and do
maintain significant discretion, and their actions and
interactions with each other and the federal government
affect policy implementation and its effects. 70 Rather than
simplifying matters, different forms of cooperative or
uncooperative federalism often add to the system’s
complexity,
making
state-level
heterogeneity
and
interdependence relevant even when the federal government
steps in to guide state policy experimentation.71
II. HETEROGENEITY AND EXPERIMENTAL FEDERALISM
Within federalism scholarship, heterogeneity typically
arises in discussions about either localism or pluralism. From
a localist perspective, federalism allows state governments,
68. See MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 13.
69. Yaneer Bar-Yam, Complexity Rising: From Human Beings to Human
Civilization, A Complexity Profile, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS 22
(2002).
70. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative
Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258 (2009); Evan H. Caminker, State
Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to
Implement Federal Law, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1079 (1995); CunninghamParmeter, supra note 18, at 1676-77; Heather K. Gerken, The Federal(ism)
Society, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 941, 943 (2013); Erin Ryan, Negotiating
Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); Robert. A. Schapiro, From Dualist
Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1, 8-9 (2006); Robert A.
Schapiro, Towards a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 250
(2005); Phillip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665-66 (2001).
71. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism:
Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2103-08 (2014).
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equipped with knowledge of their unique and very different
communities, to make better policy choices than a “one size
fits all” approach imposed by a national government. 72 From
a pluralist vantage point, federalism prevents a
heterogeneous society from breaking apart by allowing
groups that are unable to garner a national majority to
nevertheless find space to express their policy preferences at
the state level.73
This Part argues that heterogeneity matters for
experimental federalism as well. With its focus on emergent
behavior, complexity brings heterogeneity’s influential role
in defining a system’s experimental performance into sharp
focus, raising new questions that have drawn surprisingly
limited attention from constitutional scholars:74
x How do differences among states help to define
federalism’s emergent output of policy experiments
and innovations?
x How can institutional designers build the “right
amount” of heterogeneity into a federalist structure so
that the system can enhance its adaptive capacity
without losing stability?
x Is it possible for law to “nudge” experimental
federalism towards the ideal level of heterogeneity at
any given time, and if so, how do different types of
interventions play out?
What follows is an initial effort to engage these questions
by outlining the ways, both positive and negative, that
heterogeneity among state policy preferences affects
federalism’s experimental output and emergent features. In
turn, a better understanding of these dynamics can guide
institutional and legal choices to improve federalism’s
capacity for innovation and experimentation.

72. See Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1120 (1999).
73. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview,
123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1895 (2014).
74. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 24, at 1822.
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A. The Upside of Heterogeneity
Intuitively, the idea that “differences matter” for
decentralized systems to thrive has some appeal.75 For
example, in complex biological systems, evolution occurs
through mutations and variation among the system’s
components, launching a process of natural selection. 76
Heterogeneity is often a precondition for progress and
survival in the natural world.
Within federalist systems, heterogeneity performs a
similar function—it spurs emergent behavior that can help
the system compensate for experimental deficiencies in its
individual components.77 Indeed, many of federalism’s
experimental benefits are dependent upon states having
different policy preferences and approaching problems in
materially different ways.78
Specifically, heterogeneity, as a systemic feature,
benefits federalism by improving the system’s ability to
overcome four critical constraints on effective policy

75. See Walter F. Powell & Stine Grodal, Networks of Innovators, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 56, 59 (Jan Fagerberg & David C. Mowery eds.,
2006).
76. See Bednar, Subsidiarity and Robustness, supra note 21, at 7 (describing
biological adaptation as a “multifaceted selection process that gives diverse new
forms a chance to prove themselves in the environment.”); Ruhl, Law’s
Complexity, supra note 33, at 892.
77. In this context, heterogeneity refers to what Heather Gerken calls “secondorder” diversity among state policy preferences about a given policy. As she
defines it, “[s]econd-order diversity involves variation among decisionmaking
bodies, not within them.” Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 45, at 1102.
“Second-order” diversity does not mean that each state has a diverse internal
population. Indeed, high levels of first-order diversity (diverse populations within
states) can actually decrease second-order diversity; states that all have the same
very diverse population can end up with “second-order” preferences that look very
similar to one another.
78. Federalism’s experimental output is by no means limited to state activity.
Local governments are a powerful source of policy experimentation. See Gerken,
Foreword: Federalism, supra note 24; R.A. Lenhardt, Localities as Equality
Innovators, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 265 (2011); Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden,
Bottom-Up Federalism: The Diffusion of Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to
States, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825 (2006).
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experimentation: (1) bounded rationality; (2) free-riding; (3)
premature convergence; and (4) cartelization.
1. Bounded Rationality. State governments usually
make decisions under uncertain conditions.79 And, like most
decision-makers, they face uncertainty while operating
under conditions of “bounded rationality.”80 States often
decide whether to conduct a policy experiment with limited
information, incorrect information, or without full knowledge
of all the available policy options and their potential
implications.81
These limitations—regardless of whether they are
caused by resource constraints, lack of expertise, a volatile
environment, or political preferences—can make it difficult
for a state to effectively search for and find the optimal policy.
Indeed, state governments often do not expend their limited
supply of time and energy to search for all the available policy
options and will sometimes fail to select the best policy even
if they are aware of it.82
Heterogeneity helps experimental federalism overcome
the constraints that bounded rationality imposes on state
policymakers and reinforces the notion that “[o]ptimal
systems can be composed of suboptimal parts.” 83 While the
reasons require some detailed explanation, the basic idea is
simple: given limited information, a heterogeneous
population of states will engage in more policy
experimentation and is more likely to discover the optimal

79. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional
Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1427 (2011) (“Most government decisions must
be made under conditions of substantial uncertainty, in which the optimal choice
depends on information about consequences that can never be known with
anything approaching certainty.”).
80. See Kurt Weyland, Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin
American Pension Reform, 57 WORLD POL. 262, 271 (2005).
81. See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1671-72.
82. See Steven Callandar, Searching for Good Policies, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
643, 643 (2011).
83. Bednar, Political Science of Federalism, supra note 21, at 280.

260

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

policy options than a homogeneous group of states. 84
In order to understand the relationship between
heterogeneity and bounded rationality, imagine two different
countries that use a federalism model, and that each country
is composed of nine states. In the first country, known as
Homogeneous Nation, all the states are similar to one
another: their populations have similar political preferences,
they measure policy success in similar ways, and they use
similar methods to address policy problems, like a country
composed of fifty states of Texas. In the second country,
known as Heterogeneous Nation, the states differ from one
another in meaningful ways. Each state has different core
political values, different policy objectives, and different
measurements for success.85 Most importantly, the states in
both nations have one thing in common: they are all equal in
their problem-solving ability.86
Suppose the states in each nation were asked to solve the
same policy problem: the best policy for cutting emissions
from power plants within their state. Each state has the
same menu of ten policies (designated A–F) to choose from.
Each of those policies is ranked on a scale of 1–10 (10 being
the best option) according to three metrics: economic cost,
effectiveness in reducing emissions, and the degree to which
the policy reflects the preferences of the state’s electorate
(political cost).

84. See SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY
CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 157 (2007) [hereinafter
PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE].
85. See Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for
Scholars and Practitioners, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 788 (2012) [hereinafter Shipan
& Volden, Policy Diffusion] (suggesting state policy goals vary from state to state).
86. See PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 84, at 153.
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Policy

Economic Cost

Effectiveness

Political Cost

Total

A

9

7

7

23

B

10

5

9

24

C

6

10

8

23

D

4

3

3

10

E

7

6

1

14

F

5

9

4

18

G

8

1

6

15

H

2

2

5

9

I

3

4

2

9

J

1

8

10

19

When all three factors are considered together and
weighted equally, Options A, B, and C are the optimal policy
choices.87
In Homogeneous Nation, the states have similar
priorities and perspectives. As a result, each state is focused
on one factor above all others: economic cost. If we graph the
ten policy options based on cost, here’s how they look:

87. See id. at 139-43.
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Homogeneous Nation
Policy Ranking
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J

Policy Option

How will the states in Homogeneous Nation, operating
under conditions of bounded rationality without knowledge
of which policy is best, go about searching for the best policy
within this “policy landscape?” Let’s assume that each
individual state will begin their search by examining one
potential solution. This “starting point” might be the result
of many factors: political realities, policy preferences, cost
limitations, or path dependence (the notion that past policy
choices exert a large effect on future decisions). Further, let
us assume that each state in Homogeneous Nation, again
operating under conditions of bounded rationality, will
expend some (but not unlimited) time trying to solve the
problem. Moreover, each state is willing to expend resources
to explore some, but not all, alternative policy options
(beyond their starting point) to see if there is a better choice
available.
To represent bounded rationality’s limitations on each
state’s experimental strategy, states in Homogeneous Nation
use the following process to find the best possible policy: they
will start at a random point on the landscape, and will then

2015] COMPLEX EXPERIMENTAL FEDERALISM

263

look to solutions to the immediate left or right. If those
solutions are better than the starting point, they will adopt
that solution and repeat the search process from the new
vantage point. When they arrive at a solution where there is
no better solution to the immediate left or right, they will stop
and implement that option.88
For each state, this stopping point is known as the “local
optimum.”89 For example, a Homogeneous Nation state
starting at Option D will look to Options C and E on the
immediate left and right and choose E, which has a higher
value than either C or D. Then, repeating the search from
Option E, it examines Options D and F. Seeing that E is
higher than both, the state selects Option E—its local
optimum. Similarly, a state that starts at Option I will
remain “stuck” there, since options H and J to the immediate
left and right both have lower values.
Assuming a random distribution of starting points, the
nine states within Homogeneous Nation will get stuck at one
of four local optima: Options B, E, G, or I. Homogeneous
Nation will produce four policy experiments and gather data
about those four policy options. Only one of those options—
Option B—is among the top four overall options, known as
“global optima.”
Now, consider states within Heterogeneous Nation
operating with the same search strategy. In Heterogeneous
Nation, the states disagree about how to assess which policy
is best: there are three states that care most about economic
cost, three that care about effectiveness, and three that care
about political cost. Their policy landscape, which contains a
much wider range of local optima, looks like this:

88. See id. at 141.
89. Id.
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Heterogeneous Nation
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Policy Option

The states that care about cost will get “stuck” on one of
four solutions: B, E, G, and I—the same solutions adopted by
Homogeneous Nation. But the states that focus on
effectiveness will arrive at different local optima—Options A,
C, F, and J. And states that focus on political costs will end
up at solutions B, G, and J. Within Heterogeneous Nation,
states will potentially conduct nine different experiments
from a population of eight potential solutions: A, B, C, E, F,
G, I, and J. When compared with Homogeneous Nation, there
will be more policy experimentation, more information
gathered about the policy landscape, and a greater chance
that at least one state will arrive at one of the best overall
solutions—A, B, or C.
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Why is Heterogeneous Nation better able than
Homogeneous Nation to overcome bounded rationality’s
limitations? Similar states are likely to attack policy
problems in similar ways.90 They are likely to start their
search at similar places, evaluate policy options using similar
metrics, and use similar search strategies. 91 This means the
states in Homogeneous Nation are more likely to have the
same local optima and that they will get “stuck” on similar
solutions.
By contrast, heterogeneity increases the possibility that
states will begin searching for solutions in different places,
use different metrics, think about their search in different
ways, and get stuck at different local optima.92 This increases
both the range of local optima within the system and the
chances at least one state will experiment with solutions that
are among the best available solutions.93 It also means a
wider range of different policies will actually make it to the
experimentation stage.
Heterogeneous Nation’s superior ability to deal with the
limits of bounded rationality is dependent on a few preconditions: the problem solvers in Homogeneous Nation
cannot be significantly better at problem-solving than the
states in Heterogeneous Nation, and the states in
Heterogeneous Nation need to have some differences in their
“local optima.”94 But assuming these basic conditions are in
place, Heterogeneous Nation will not only produce more
experiments, but is more likely to arrive at the global
optimum.95
2. Free-Riding. Federalism scholars have long recognized
the significant risk that states will free-ride off each others’
experiments.96 In short, the argument goes, since a state will
90. See id. at 153, 157.
91. Id. at 153-58.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 157.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 152-65.
96. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 610-11.
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produce information about its own policy experiments that is
available at little or no cost to other states, states have an
incentive to “free-ride” on each other’s experiments.97 This
creates a problem: rather than conducting experiments or
gathering information about a policy issue, many states will
choose to simply do nothing.98 Instead, they will let other
states undertake risky experiments and wait to get
information about the results. 99 They will then “copy”
successful experiments without having to undertake the cost
and risk of experimenting on their own, and reject the
unsuccessful ones.100 The result is a sub-optimal level of
experimentation, where free riders wait for first-movers to
take on the risk of failure rather than trying out their own
innovations.101
Free-riding creates at least two major problems for
experimental federalism. First, it leads to less
experimentation because free-riding states will choose to let
other states take on the political and economic risks of policy
failure rather than conducting their own policy experiments.
Indeed, when there is a high risk that other states will freeride off their experiments, innovating states may
intentionally choose policies that are less attractive to other
states—and even inadequate for their own needs—to prevent
others from copying their experiments.102
97. Indeed, because technology has made it easier than ever before to obtain
information, it also becomes easier to free-ride off the information generated by
other states. David Lazer, Information and Innovation in a Networked World, in
DYNAMIC SOCIAL NETWORK MODELING AND ANALYSIS: WORKSHOP SUMMARY AND
PAPERS 101 (Ronald Breiger et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Lazer, Information and
Innovation].
98. See Stephenson, supra note 79, at 1464-67.
99. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 603-06; Stephenson, supra note 79,
at 1464-67.
100. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 604. There is some data to suggest
that this is a real problem, and that states will under-experiment when there is
a high risk of free riding. See Galle & Leahy, supra note 62, at 1343.
101. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 605-06.
102. See Steven Callandar & Bård Harstad, Experimentation in Federal
Systems 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19601, 2013),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19601.
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Second, free-riding risk causes information deficits, as
experimenting states choose not to generate or share
information about their policies to prevent other states from
free-riding.103 This deprives the system of critical data that
could help other states or the federal government identify the
best available policy solution.104
Heterogeneity offers a systemic solution to both underexperimentation and information deficits.105 In Homogeneous
Nation, where jurisdictions have similar policy preferences,
the risk of free-riding is high: policies are easily transferable
from one state to another and the information generated
about an innovating state’s experiments will be very useful
to other states.106 Therefore, with a lot of useful information
available at low cost, states will have a strong incentive to
free-ride on other states’ experiments instead of
innovating.107
Heterogeneous Nation, by contrast, should have fewer
free-riders because policy solutions that work in one state are
less likely to work in others.108 Since information about other
states’ experiments is less useful,109 states in Heterogeneous
Nation are less likely to copy one another’s innovations and
more likely to conduct experiments on their own. As one
recent study notes, “[i]n the case of highly dissimilar
jurisdictions, there is innovation because, contrary to the
assumptions of the free-rider scenario, there is little or no
information externality. Information generated in one place
is just not that useful in others.”110 Moreover, states in
103. Galle & Leahy, supra note 62, at 1351-52.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1346-47.
106. Id.
107. See David Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism as Networked Order: The
International System as an Informal Network, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.,
Mar. 2005, at 52, 61 [hereinafter Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism].
108. See Callandar & Harstad, supra note 102, at 3; Lazer, Information and
Innovation, supra note 97, at 110.
109. See Cai & Treisman, supra note 11, at 49; Callandar & Harstad, supra note
102, at 3.
110. See Galle & Leahy, supra note 62, at 1360.
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Heterogeneous Nation will produce more information about
their experiments since that information is less likely to be
useful to competitors.
Even when there is a high risk of free-riding, some states
will still decide to experiment and produce information.111 In
particular, policy evangelists—states that want their policies
to spread to other states—will generate information about
their experiments in the hope the other states will adopt the
policy.112 Some evangelists want to advance a national
political profile or agenda; others want to pocket the network
effects that come with more states adopting their chosen
policy.113
Heterogeneous Nation creates a fertile ground for policy
evangelism, and evangelists help the system overcome the
information deficits created by free-riding risks. Evangelists
are more likely to invest resources in generating information
about their experimental results if they think there is a good
chance that other states will use it to adopt their preferred
policy, and less likely to invest if there is little chance of the
policy spreading.114 In Homogeneous Nation, where states
largely agree on policy objectives, there may be little
incentive for policy evangelists to invest in generating
information about their policies because there are few areas
of disagreement to begin with—policy evangelists are always
preaching to the choir, and there are only very few states that
need convincing. Moreover, polarization—a phenomenon
that occurs within homogeneous groups—moves group
members towards more extreme positions, making them even
less susceptible to different perspectives.
By contrast, if Heterogeneous Nation contains a wide
distribution of policy preferences, policy evangelists have a
greater chance of finding another state that might be
interested in copying their policy. This should incentivize
111. Id. at 1361-67.
112. Id. at 1386. There are a lot of reasons states might want to get other states
to adopt their solutions—politicians that hope to create a national reputation, or
the network benefits that can result from other states adopting the same model.
See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 24, at 63.
113. Galle & Leahy, supra note 62, at 1386-89.
114. See Stephenson, supra note 79, at 1471-74.
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evangelist states to invest in producing information about
their policies, even when there is some risk that others will
free-ride off of their efforts.
3. Premature Convergence. Sometimes, states all arrive
at a similar solution to a policy problem, but that solution
turns out to be suboptimal or may prove suboptimal as time
goes on. This problem is known as premature convergence,
and it prevents federalist systems from internalizing the full
benefits of state experimentation. The laboratories simply
shut down before they have a chance to explore the entire
policy landscape and the system loses out on valuable
information and exploration.
Premature convergence is the product of three
phenomena: information cascades, risk-aversion, and
polarization. Heterogeneity helps federalism minimize the
risk associated with all three sources of premature
convergence, and prevents states from getting “stuck” with
the same suboptimal policy.
Cascades. Premature convergence can arise from
information cascades, where policymakers stop relying on
their own information and begin to make decisions based on
the actions of others.115 This type of “policy contagion” can
occur, for example, when a series of Democratic state
legislatures rapidly enact a policy that has been adopted by
a leading “blue” state without questioning the rationale
behind the policy, the accuracy of its policy results, its
potential long-term effects, or its suitability for other
states.116 If the initial state’s information or decision is flawed
or somehow incomplete, information cascades can cause
decentralized systems to converge prematurely on a bad
policy. Moreover, information cascades can shut down the
search for new information or lead decision-makers to

115. SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 55; see Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning
from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12
J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 154 (1998).
116. For examples of this sort of convergence, see GRAEME BOUSHEY, POLICY
DIFFUSION DYNAMICS IN AMERICA (2010) [hereinafter BOUSHEY, POLICY
DIFFUSION]; Sean Nicholson-Crotty, The Politics of Diffusion: Public Policy in the
American States, 71 J. POL. 192 (2009).
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improperly discount information that is actually useful.117
Cascade risks are even higher in a networked world
where, at very low cost, states can easily learn and free-ride
off what other states are doing118 and where interest groups
or political parties can launch simultaneous policy initiatives
in multiple states.119 Experimental federalism also carries a
high risk of cascades that flow from bad information. In order
to avoid the high political costs that come from policy failures,
state leaders have strong political incentives to hide negative
information about the policy or to produce information that
is unreliable or incomplete.120
Heterogeneity is a partial systemic solution to cascade
risks. As discussed earlier, Heterogeneous Nation will
produce more experiments and a greater amount of publicly
available information than Homogeneous Nation. It is also
more likely that Heterogeneous states will generate different
types of information, prioritize that information differently,
and analyze existing information in different ways. The
quantity and diversity of information in Heterogeneous
Nation makes it less likely that a single piece of information
will permeate throughout the entire system121 and more
likely that at least some actors within the system will
discount cascading information. Different value systems
create incentives for states to evaluate policy success in
different ways, which constrains the risk of cascades.
Heterogeneous Nation will also contain a wider
distribution of states whose preferences leave them with
different abilities to tolerate risk—some states are riskseeking early “adopters” of innovative policy; others are riskaverse late “adopters.”122 The late adopters are more likely to
view information with a skeptical eye towards the risks
117. See Stephenson, supra note 79, at 1475-76.
118. See Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1435, 1455-56 (2011).
119. See Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 5107, at 62.
120. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL
IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 12.
121. Lazer, Information and Innovation, supra note 97, at 117.
122. See Shipan & Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, supra note 62.
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involved in change. This delay not only helps to stop
cascades, but gives the federal government more time to
learn about the long-term consequences of a given policy
before deciding to pursue national implementation.123
Risk-Aversion. A second cause of policy convergence is
risk-aversion. Federalist systems can generate suboptimal
experimentation because no state will deliberately choose to
experiment with a policy that is likely to fail. 124 When
effective experimentation relies on something like the
scientific method to succeed—the ability to test multiple
hypotheses and to systematically observe which hypotheses
are proven or disproven—the system benefits from failed
experiments, which generate information that is useful for
subsequent experiments. Since no state wants to take on the
costs of failure and there is no centralized body that assigns
riskier policy options to reluctant states, each state will try
and choose the best available option and avoid experiments
with low odds but potentially high payoffs.125 Instead of
having multiple states engaged in simultaneous
experiments, all states will converge around the same lowrisk experiment.126 While this experiment may be the best
immediately available option, it might not be the optimal
long-term option or even the one with the highest potential
payoff.
But in Heterogeneous Nation, a solution that works in
one state may not work in another. States are more likely to
disagree about what the best option is and how to measure
success and will find a larger range of policy options
potentially attractive. This increases the chance that instead
of converging on a single best-available option, states will
disagree about what the best-available option actually is.
This disagreement makes it more likely that states will
experiment with different policies, including innovations
that might fail in the long run but will nevertheless produce
useful information.
123. See Bednar, Nudging Federalism, supra note 10, at 510-11.
124. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 120, at 27.
125. See id. at 26-28.
126. Cai & Treisman, supra note 11, at 49.
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Polarization. A third source of premature convergence is
group polarization: the well-documented tendency of likeminded groups to adopt more extreme views than each
member of the group would adopt on their own.127 A nation
composed of a large number of “red states” is more likely to
adopt policies that are extremely conservative than a nation
where “red states” enjoy a small majority. In a federalism
context, polarization can decrease and homogenize the range
of experiments each state is willing to conduct and lead states
to discount potentially useful information that conflicts with
the polarized perspective.
Just like judicial panels composed of a diverse group of
judges, state heterogeneity can help a decentralized system
resist pressure towards premature convergence on a small
range of extreme solutions generated by a polarized political
environment. “Dissenting” states can slow policy diffusion
and potentially operate as a moderating force by “factchecking” the information provided by polarized states and
help the system generate a full range of policy alternatives.
4. Competition and Cartels. As Michael Greve points out,
the success of experimental federalism hinges in part on
whether states are operating in a cooperative or competitive
context.128 Competition promotes innovation,129 as states seek
to develop policies that will differentiate them from their
neighbors and draw taxpayers and jobs.
Yet states (like most industries), if left to their own
devices, may choose not to compete with one another. 130
Instead, they will try to cooperate and form cartels. When
operating in this cooperative mode, Greve suggests they will
127. SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 111. For evidence of polarization in state
governments, see Justin Phillips & Jeffrey Lax, The Democratic Deficit in the
States, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 148 (2012); Pickerill & Bowling, supra note 16, at 37273.
128. GREVE, supra note 1, at 195; see also JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, HORIZONTAL
FEDERALISM: INTERSTATE RELATIONS (2011); Winter, supra note 10, at 276
(arguing that federalism capitalizes on the experimental benefits of competition).
129. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 128; Ann O’M. Bowman, Horizontal
Federalism: Exploring Interstate Interactions, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
535, 536 (2004).
130. Shipan & Volden, Policy Diffusion, supra note 85, at 790.
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work together to seek federal intervention or preemption in
order to avoid the costs of having to compete with other states
on taxes or policy.131 This state-level push towards
cartelization can have negative effects on innovation and
experimentation. In a cooperative environment, states may
seek uniform federal regulation and encourage the national
government to assume costs or responsibility for programs
and value choices that would otherwise impose economic and
political costs on state political actors. And, with little
incentive for cartelized states to innovate in order to compete
for a limited pool of resources, state policies will remain at
the status quo.
Heterogeneity can help preserve a competitive policy
environment132 and guard against joint efforts by states to
seek preemptive uniform policy from the federal government.
With “dissenting states” acting as a potential barrier to
collective action, heterogeneity makes it more difficult for
states to engage in the sort of cooperative, cartelizing
behavior that shuts down innovation.133 When there is a
strong minority of states that disagree with the majority’s
efforts towards cartelization, those states can resist federal
preemption and preserve policy competition and state-level
innovation.
B. The Downside of Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity comes with a cost, and within a federalist
structure those costs can be substantial. While federalism
can serve as a mechanism for managing diversity within a
society,134 heterogeneity can be a source of social conflict
among states or between states and the national government.
In its most extreme incarnation, heterogeneity can cause the
types of irreconcilable differences that result in civil war and
disintegration.135
131. GREVE, supra note 1, at 191-92.
132. PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 20, at 216-17.
133. GREVE, supra note 1, at 10.
134. BEDNAR, ROBUST FEDERATION, supra note 10, at 45, 47; Brancati, supra note
65, at 681 (concluding that decentralization is a “useful mechanism in reducing
both ethnic conflict and secessionism.”).
135. BEDNAR, ROBUST FEDERATION, supra note 10, at 47.
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But even in a more benign form, too much heterogeneity
can act as an obstacle to federalism’s ability to facilitate
innovation and can place limits on the system’s ability to
internalize the benefits gained from certain kinds of
experiments. Specifically, federalist systems with high levels
of heterogeneity can experience problems caused by: (1)
increased information costs; (2) barriers to collective action;
and (3) limitations on the network benefits associated with
certain policies.
1. Information Costs. Heterogeneity can make it more
difficult
for
decentralized
systems
to
aggregate
information.136 States will gather and analyze information in
ways that reflect their policy goals. When states have
different goals and values, the information they generate will
differ as well. These variations in the types of information
that states produce can make it difficult to compare the
effectiveness of policies from different states, or to aggregate
information about policies implemented in multiple states.
Moreover, just as similarities make it more likely that
entities will communicate with one another, 137 preferential
differences can also make it more likely that a state will
discount or ignore useful information from other states based
on mistrust of its sources.138
Even in situations where states trust the information
produced by other states, heterogeneity may render the
information less useful. On the state level, federalist systems
benefit when innovations generated by one state prove useful
to others.139 But when states have different goals, the
innovations they generate are not as easily transferable. 140
Heterogeneity can constrain the system’s potential for

136. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 120, at 27-28.
137. See Miller McPherson et al., Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social
Networks, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 415 (2001).
138. See Bednar, Subsidiarity and Robustness, supra note 21, at 245-46.
139. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 18.
140. BEDNAR, ROBUST FEDERATION, supra note 10, at 31; Craig Volden,
Entrusting the States with Welfare Reform, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE
STATES BE TRUSTED? 82, 83 (John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Winegast eds., 1997).
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replication: there may be more innovation occurring, but “the
overall societal gains from innovation will be small.”141
Heterogeneity presents similar obstacles for the vertical
diffusion of state experiments. From the federal
government’s perspective, the most useful state laboratories
are those that best reflect the national population’s
preferences, since those states generate innovations that are
most likely to work, and have political support, on the
national level. Greater heterogeneity limits the number of
states that fit this profile, which constrains the federal
government’s access to useful information and places a cap
on the range of state policy experiments suitable for national
adoption.142
2. Coordination and Collective Action. Heterogeneity
among states can become problematic when effective
innovation requires some form of coordinated or collective
action.143 This can lead to: (a) difficulty solving highly
complex policy problems; (b) decreased levels of public goods;
(c) an increase in negative externalities created by state
experimentation; or (d) inefficiency and stagnation when
policymaking relies on cooperation between states and the
federal government.
Greater Difficulty in Solving Complex Policy Problems.
Consider three types of policy problems that are confronted
by Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Nations: simple,
moderate, and difficult. For simple problems, where the
policy landscape clearly leads each problem solver toward the
global optimum, picture a landscape that looks like a single
mountain peak: heterogeneity can create a lot of inefficiency
and wasted time.144 With simple problems, where a fairly
unsophisticated problem solver can locate the global

141. See Galle & Leahy, supra note 62, at 1360.
142. Ken Kollman et al., Decentralization and the Search for Policy Solutions,
16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 102, 121-24 (2000) [hereinafter Kollman et al.,
Decentralization]; see also Lazer & Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 66, at 838.
143. See Kollman et al., Decentralization, supra note 142, at 124.
144. Id. at 104, 117-18.
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optimum, a homogeneous environment may provide a more
efficient structure for arriving at the optimal solution.145
But moderately complex problems look more like the
multi-peaked,
“rugged”
landscape
confronted
by
Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Nations earlier. 146 Harder
problems often have many local optima where problem
solvers get stuck, and those local optima change dramatically
depending upon the individual problem solver’s interpretive
perspective.147 As a result, heterogeneity can make a real
difference when states encounter a moderately complex
problem and where diverse perspectives alter each problemsolver’s approach to policy search.148
For problems of high complexity (e.g., an effort to cure
cancer), where there are many local optima and where the
search for a global optimum is exceedingly challenging,
heterogeneity can potentially inhibit the system’s
performance.149 These types of problems may benefit from
centralized goal-setting and coordination, a well-established
centralized research structure and larger budgets,
collaboration, as well as avoiding the potential externalities
that can result when multiple decentralized entities are
adopting different policies.150 These externalities can increase
the complexity of the problem and even alter the outcomes
associated with different solutions.151
As a result, policy differences within Heterogeneous
Nation may make it more difficult for states to cooperate or
respond well to coordination by the federal government. In
turn, Homogeneous Nation may be in a better position to deal
with highly complex or resource-intensive problems where
145. See id.
146. See id. at 117.
147. Id. at 114.
148. See id. at 119-20.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 124.
151. See BEDNAR, ROBUST FEDERATION, supra note 10, at 32-33; Kollman et al.,
Decentralization, supra note 142, at 121. Note that these conclusions don’t
account for a volatile system environment. Bednar, Subsidiarity and Robustness,
supra note 21, at 9 n.3.
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cooperation among the system’s components is essential to
finding a solution.
Decreased Public Goods. Collective action remains a
challenge in any federalist system, and heterogeneity can
exacerbate the problem when states must act together to
provide certain public goods.152 If states are only willing to
support policy experiments that further their own individual
policy goals, differences in goals can mean fewer
contributions towards those shared efforts.153 This lack of
social consensus may also make it less likely that states will
agree to try out selfless experiments: innovations that impose
significant costs on the experimenting state, but would
benefit the nation as a whole.154
Increased Negative Externalities. Heterogeneity can also
increase the potential for states to adopt policies that harm
other states by creating obstacles to cooperative actions that
minimize them.155 While federal action is often the best
available solution for state policies that impose negative
externalities, it is also hard to bring about.156 More often than
not, states must rely on more informal methods of negotiation
and cooperation to deal with spillover effects.157 To the extent
that differences among states make this sort of negotiation
and
cooperation
difficult
and
more
contentious,
heterogeneity can lead to an increase in state experiments
that benefit the innovating state but externalize negative
costs onto others.
Uncooperative Federalism. Policy experimentation in
certain areas is generated through the “cooperative” efforts
of state and federal authorities, in which states generate
policy experiments within the constraints of broad federal
152. See Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing
Federalism, 21 J. L. ECON. ORG. 103 (2005).
153. See PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 84, at 281-82; Aziz Z. Huq, Does the
Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 217, 246
(2014).
154. See Bednar, Nudging Federalism, supra note 10, at 510-11.
155. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 24, at 61-62.
156. Id. at 90.
157. See id. at 90-91.
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guidelines or with the active cooperation of federal officials.
When state and federal governments have similar goals,
cooperative federalism can lead to effective innovation. 158
However, when federal and state authorities have different
goals, the relationship can become adversarial and
“uncooperative,” which can make it difficult to search for the
best policy or develop a coherent strategy. 159 To the extent
that heterogeneity makes it more likely for a high number of
states to maintain policy goals that depart from national
preferences, it can act as an obstacle to optimal policy
experimentation in the “cooperative” federalism sphere.
3. Network Benefits. Certain policies benefit from
widespread adoption: the more states that implement the
policy, the greater the benefits. These network benefits can
increase with the number of states that adopt the policy. For
example, state policies that affect multi-state businesses may
only be worthwhile if a critical mass of states adopt the same
policy.160
If an experiment benefits from network effects,
heterogeneity imposes a cost by making it less likely that a
policy will transfer between jurisdictions. To the extent that
heterogeneity makes it more difficult to achieve convergence
around a single policy, policies that enjoy significant network
effects will suffer and policy experiments that are only
optimal when significant numbers of states adopt them will
go unexplored.161
C. Managing Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity is a critical variable in determining
whether federalism delivers on its experimental promise. A
system that is able to maintain diverse policy approaches
may have an advantage in dealing with the experimental
limits presented by bounded rationality, free-riding,
premature convergence, and cartelization. At the same time,
a heterogeneous system may be more likely to struggle with
158. See Bednar, Political Science of Federalism, supra note 21, at 277.
159. See id.
160. See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480,
545 (2008).
161. Id.
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increased information costs, barriers to experiments that
depend on collective or cooperative action, and underexperimentation with policies whose full potential depends
on network benefits.
Beyond its effects on experimental output, heterogeneity
also helps maintain a “robust federation” that can survive
catastrophic events and adapt to change.162 As Jenna Bednar
has noted, federalism’s decentralized structure has the added
normative benefit of strengthening the system’s resilience to
change by creating redundancies in governmental
responsibility, while also helping the system adapt to change
through policy diversity.163 Just like complex ecosystems,
diversity can help enhance federalism’s robustness and the
system’s long-term potential for survival in a dynamic
world.164
A full account of heterogeneity’s effects on experimental
federalism is only a launching pad for further exploration. As
a relatively new discipline, there is still much to learn about
how dynamic social systems can “harness complexity,”
whether it’s possible to identify the “right amount” of
heterogeneity at any given time, the best mechanisms for
moving a complex system’s components towards diversity or
homogeneity, or the extent to which legal efforts to change a
complex system will alter system-level behavior in a
predictable way.165 These are cutting edge and unresolved
issues for complexity science and well beyond the
introductory scope of this Article, but a focus on
heterogeneity suggests a frame for further investigation of
the relationship between law, experimental federalism, and
heterogeneity.
Policy diversity is not an inevitable outgrowth of
federalism’s decentralized design,166 even when the federal
government decides to stay outside the fray and allows space
162. See BEDNAR, ROBUST FEDERATION, supra note 10.
163. See id. at 170-212.
164. See PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 20, at 180-81.
165. Id. at 254-55.
166. Cf. Mark Tushnet, What Then Is the American?, 38 ARIZ L. REV. 873, 876
(1996).
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for state policy experimentation.167 Political forces that cross
state borders, like national political parties and interstate
interest groups, pursue national policy agendas through
state legislation and exert a potentially homogenizing effect
on the experimental choices available to state policy
makers.168 Interstate economic and social forces blur state
boundaries,169 as “individuals from Montana to Mississippi to
Maine can eat at the same restaurant chains, shop at the
same stores, read the same publications, and listen to the
same music.”170 Interstate mobility171 and “The Big Sort” 172

167. Federal action and preemption can often result in policy uniformity. See
Adelman & Engel, supra note 24, at 1825; Cherry, supra note 21, at 401; Listokin,
supra note 160, at 551-53.
168. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to
Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J.
1920, 1955 (2014) (“National networks pushing national agendas through the
states pose a serious challenge to conceptions of federalism grounded in
distinctive state interests.”); James A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy:
Federalism, Political Parties, and the National Colonization of State Politics, 29
J.L. & POL. 1, 39-42 (2013); Anthony Kammer, Privatizing the Safeguards of
Federalism, 29 J.L. & POL. 69, 115 (2013).
169. See Julianna Pacheco, The Social Contagion Model: Exploring the Role of
Public Opinion on the Diffusion of Antismoking Legislation Across the American
States, 74 J. POL. 187, 188-89 (2012).
170. Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 24, at 1110.
171. Tiebout sorting, a “largely neglected [phenomenon] in mainstream
constitutional theory,” is a major source of heterogeneity in federalist systems.
Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions
Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and
Theory, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 63 (2013); see also MILLER & PAGE, supra note 28,
at 17-25. States compete for citizens by offering different packages of rights,
benefits, and burdens. Citizens make choices by “voting with their feet” about
where to live and “sort” themselves among the different jurisdictions according to
the states or localities whose packages best match their preferences. Charles M.
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418-20 (1956);
see also Ken Kollman et al., Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model,
87 AM. ECON. REV. 977, 978-79, 990 (1997). As citizens group geographically
according to their preferences, states will become more heterogeneous in relation
to one another, even as they become more homogeneous internally. See Paul W.
Rhode & Koleman Strumpf, Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local
Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1648, 1655 (2003).
172. See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED
AMERICA IS TEARING US APART (2009). Contra Samuel J. Abrams & Morris P.
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affect policy diversity too. As citizens divide themselves into
internally homogeneous Red and Blue enclaves, the policy
variation generated by the need for political compromise may
decrease as polarization simultaneously narrows the political
viability for a full range of policy options.173
At the same time, other dynamics operate to spur state
policy diversity. State political cultures remain remarkably
distinct,174 and there is significant evidence to suggest that
states continue to approach similar legal and policy questions
in very different ways.175 Federal programs that create space
for policy discretion, like experimental grants, can encourage
innovation and new approaches.176 And federal gridlock has
pushed national debates and political resources to the state
level, shifting the influence of entrenched interest groups and
creating space to implement policy experiments that would
be politically impossible on a national scale.177
All of this suggests that a full account of how
experimental federalism works requires greater attention to
the larger forces that produce, maintain, and constrain
meaningful differences among states, along with the myriad
factors that drive policy activity at the state level.178 It also
suggests that law’s role in defining experimental federalism’s
outcomes is far more extensive and nuanced than
determining the boundaries of federal and state authority. 179
Fiorina, The Big Sort that Wasn’t: A Skeptical Reexamination, 45 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 203 (2012).
173. See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 24, at 88-89.
174. ANDREW GELLMAN, RED STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE, POOR STATE: WHY
AMERICANS VOTE THE WAY THEY DO 21-22 (2008)
175. See Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity,
Distinctiveness, and Political Culture in the American Federal System 66-87 (Feb.
24, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2552866.
176. DISTRICT REFORM SUPPORT NETWORK, PERSONALIZED LEARNING IN
PROGRESS: CASE STUDIES OF FOUR RACE TO THE TOP DISTRICT GRANTEES’ EARLY
IMPLEMENTATION (2014).
177. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 24, at 1809-10, 1847-48; Bulman-Pozen,
Partisan Federalism, supra note 24, at 1092-93, 1125-26.
178. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 24, at 1822.
179. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 24, at 59-64.
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Preemption doctrine and reinforcing state sovereignty under
the Tenth Amendment are not the only vehicles for law to
tinker with and alter federalism’s experimental output.180
Law affects experimentation by shaping the way the
game of state politics is played and the political, social, and
economic trends that bring state policy preferences closer
together or further apart.181 Changes in constitutional
doctrine have contributed to the recent rise of national
interest groups pursuing multi-jurisdictional policy agendas
and uniform model legislation in areas like immigration and
voter ID.182 Judicial deregulation of campaign finance laws,
lobbying restrictions, and limits on political parties have
created a fertile ground for national groups to influence state
legislation with a multistate agenda.183 Constitutional
standards governing partisan gerrymandering remain
elusive,184 allowing for increased political polarization at the
state level.185 These dynamics at the intersection of politics
and law affect policy heterogeneity within the system and
play a large role in determining whether federalism lives up
to Brandeis’s experimentalist vision.
III. INTERDEPENDENCE AND EXPERIMENTAL FEDERALISM
From a complex adaptive systems perspective,
heterogeneity is only half of the story. Federalism’s emergent
features and experimental capacity are also defined by
interdependence: the ways that a system’s components affect
the behavior of other components.186 While interdependence
can take many forms,187 the focus here is on informational
180. Bednar, Nudging Federalism, supra note 10, at 511-15.
181. Id.
182. Kammer, supra note 168, at 115.
183. Id. at 86.
184. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278-79 (2004).
185. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?:
Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 574 (2004).
186. Lazer & Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 66, at 820.
187. See Bednar, Nudging Federalism, supra note 10, at 507-08; Bednar,
Subsidiarity and Robustness, supra note 21, at 236. For example, the term
interdependence might include “spillover” effects, where policy choices made by
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interdependence and policy diffusion: the transfer of
information about policy experiments and the spread of
policies from state to state. These interstate connections
affect the system’s ability to exploit existing information and
open up new avenues for exploration.188
A focus on interdependence and diffusion moves the
study of experimental federalism away from its standard
obsession with competing spheres of federal and state
authority.189 From this vantage point, individual states are
not independent “islands,”190 but instead operate as nodes in
an interdependent system that creates and transfers
information about policy experiments and choices. 191 As
Robert Schapiro puts it, federalism consists of a set of
“individual, autonomous units, linked by a network” with
“multiple participants contributing to an unfolding, dynamic
process.”192 The connections among nodes carry information
about state-level policy successes and failures, as well as raw
data about policy outcomes.193
Within interdependent systems, network architecture—
the number and strength of the informational connections
between the nodes—helps determine the system’s overall
behavior.194 The likelihood that the nodes will exchange
information, the accuracy of that information, the frequency
of information transfer, the type of information exchanged,
one state have positive or negative effects on the policy choices made by others.
See Lazer & Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 66, at 837.
188. See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1665-67.
189. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 12, at 904-06, 933.
190. See BOUSHEY, POLICY DIFFUSION, supra note 116, at 29; see also Wiseman,
supra note 15, at 1740-41.
191. Lazer, Information and Innovation, supra note 97, at 101-04; Corey Phelps
et al., Knowledge, Networks, and Knowledge Networks: A Review and Research
Agenda, 38 J. MGMT. 1115, 1117 (2012).
192. SCHAPIRO, supra note 15, at 5, 100; see also Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note
24, at 102; Michal Shur-Ofry, IP and the Lens of Complexity, 54 IDEA 55, 58
(2014) (describing representation of complex systems as networks).
193. Lazer, Information and Innovation, supra note 97, at 53-54.
194. See THOMAS W. VALENTE, NETWORK MODELS
INNOVATIONS 60-61 (1995).
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and the sequential order that information moves through the
system all affect the choices made by individual nodes.195
In the business world, organizational design is critical to
determining whether a firm will innovate. 196 Structural
choices impose rules that determine the flow of information
within the organization, the way individuals or teams spend
their time, the resource costs imposed by the innovation
process, and how the firm responds to volatile business
environments.197 In turn, system designers that seek to
promote innovation must think carefully about whether and
how each component should communicate with other
components.198 For example, within a research and
development department, organizational designers must
determine whether different research teams working on the
same problem should share information with one another,
how closely they should work together, and the effect of those
connections on the department’s ability to innovate.
Federalist systems are no different. The rules that
govern their structure and design help determine the states’
experimental output, creating incentives for political actors
to make choices that affect the system’s larger experimental
objectives.199 The institution or removal of barriers to
information flow can change interaction patterns within the
system and alter the system’s capacity for experimentation
and innovation.200 In particular, interdependence helps
determine whether a federalist system achieves a critical

195. See Phelps et al., supra note 191, at 1122-29.
196. See Stephen J. DeCanio et al., The Importance of Organizational Structure
for the Adoption of Innovations, 46 MGMT. SCI. 1285, 1285 (2000).
197. See, e.g., id. at 1285; George Westerman et al., Organization Design and
Effectiveness over the Innovation Life Cycle, 17 ORG. SCI. 230, 230-31 (2006).
198. See Daniel Enemark et al., Knowledge and Networks: An Experimental Test
of How Network Knowledge Affects Coordination, 36 SOC. NETWORKS 122, 122, 132
(2014).
199. See Bednar, Nudging Federalism, supra note 10, at 511-14; Bednar,
Subsidiarity and Robustness, supra note 21, at 242-43.
200. See AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 33, at 78.
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equilibrium for optimal performance: a balance between
exploration and exploitation.201
A. Exploration and Exploitation
Organizational systems that face difficult problems
confront a fundamental choice about how to solve them. They
can try to address the problem through exploitation by
investing in and emphasizing existing solutions and
knowledge.202 Exploitation-based strategies typically involve
efforts to learn from what the organization already knows by
using easily accessible information, making incremental
improvements to current policies, and relying on existing
paradigms and routines.203 Alternatively, the system can
address the situation through exploration by using its time
and resources to discover and implement new solutions.204
Exploration often means learning through varied
approaches, seeking knowledge that may not be easily
available, experimentation, and breaking from existing
patterns.205
Both exploitation and exploration come with benefits and
drawbacks. When an organizational system (like a state
government) chooses to exploit existing solutions, it gains
predictability and stability while reducing the political risks
that come with policy change.206 Moreover, it avoids the costs
201. See Christina Fang et al., Balancing Exploration and Exploitation Through
Structural Design: The Isolation of Subgroups and Organizational Learning, 21
ORG. SCI. 625, 625-28 (2010); Dovev Lavie et al., Exploration and Exploitation
Within and Across Organizations, 4 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 109, 132 (2010).
202. See James G. March, Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational
Learning, 2 ORG. SCI. 71, 85 (1991).
203. See Anil K. Gupta et al., The Interplay Between Exploration and
Exploitation, 49 ACAD. MGMT. J. 693, 694 (2006).
204. Id.
205. See id. at 694-95. The literature on exploration, exploitation, and
innovation is extensive. See, e.g., Mary J. Benner & Michael L. Tushman,
Exploitation, Exploration, and Process Management: The Productivity Dilemma
Revisited, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 238 (2013); Carlisle & McMillan, supra note 57;
DeCanio et al., supra note 196; Fang et al., supra note 201; Lavie et al., supra
note 201; March, supra note 202; Westerman et al., supra note 197.
206. See Lavie et al., supra note 201, at 115-16.
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and risks involved in searching for and implementing a new
and experimental policy. Yet exploitation carries its own set
of problems. Systems that rely exclusively on exploitation can
find themselves stagnating around suboptimal solutions,
experiencing competitive disadvantage, or becoming obsolete
when existing approaches cannot adapt to internal or
external changes.207 Exploitation can also lead to
homogenization and “groupthink,” as decision-makers
become “locked in” to existing solutions over time and
converge around a single viewpoint.208
Like exploitation, exploration-based strategies have
their own cost-benefit calculation. On one hand, exploration
allows systems to maintain a diverse approach to problem
solving, as multiple organizational sub-units pursue
different experimental strategies.209 Exploration can also
help systems adapt to and survive dynamic change, as the
pursuit of multiple innovative solutions increases the
possibility that at least one solution will prove successful in
a new environment.210 On the other hand, exploration can
prove costly and risky, and systems can lose the benefits
associated with convergence around a single stable solution:
economies of scale, enhanced efficiency through coordination,
increased competence, and predictability. It can also prove
chaotic, as the permanent quest for new ideas leads to a state
of “eternal boiling,” where good ideas are constantly washed
away in a new wave of change.211
Systems achieve long-term optimal performance by
finding a balance between exploration and exploitation.212 A
system that expends all its resources to constantly explore
new policy experiments risks inefficiency because it fails to
207. See Fang et al., supra note 201, at 625-27.
208. Bill McKelvey et al., Re-thinking Kaufmann’s NK Fitness Landscape: From
Artifact and Groupthink to Weak-Tie Effects, 32 HUM. SYS. MGMT. 17, 25 (2013).
209. See Fang et al., supra note 201, at 625-26; March, supra note 202, at 72.
210. Bednar, Subsidiarity & Robustness, supra note 21, at 239.
211. AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 33, at 43-44.
212. See Lavie et al., supra note 201, at 128-29; March, supra note 202, at 71.
But see Carlisle & McMillan, supra note 67, at 3 (suggesting the idea of “balance”
may be problematic from a complex adaptive systems perspective).
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fully exploit the resources it has,213 while a system with too
much exploitation risks obsolescence and rigidity.214
The
ideal
system
pursues
both
strategies
simultaneously, gaining stability and efficiency by making
the most of existing solutions and information, while also
exploring new strategies that lead to growth and
adaptation.215 Yet finding this balance can be challenging,
since there is often a direct tradeoff between the two
approaches—an investment in exploitation usually involves
diverting resources from exploration, and vice versa.216
B. Interdependence and the Balance Between Exploration
and Exploitation
The search for the ideal “balance” between exploration
and exploitation is, at its root, a design challenge. The
number and strength of the connections between the system’s
nodes influences the system’s overall approach to problem
solving. In turn, different choices about network architecture
affect the system’s performance 217 and can nudge the system
toward different points on the exploration-exploitation
spectrum.218 For experimental federalism, this requires a
focus on the informational and policy links between states,
and the ways that those connections help move the system
towards an optimal balance between exploration and
exploitation.
There are at least three features of American federalism
that make it challenging to arrive at or impose a normative
theory that will move the system towards that perfect
balance, even if it’s possible to figure out where that balance
213. See Bednar, Subsidiarity & Robustness, supra note 21, at 239.
214. See Lavie et al., supra note 201, at 115-16. Note that because policy choices
are often path dependent, systems that do nothing but exploit become more and
more locked into their earlier policy choices, making it more and more impossible
to move in alternative directions. Id. at 125.
215. See Benner & Tushman, supra note 205, at 238, 252; Gupta et al., supra
note 203, at 697; March, supra note 202, at 71-72.
216. AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 33, at 44-45.
217. See Enemark et al., supra note 198, at 122, 132.
218. See Lavie et al., supra note 201, at 122-23.
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is. First, federalism exhibits characteristics of both
hierarchical systems, where a centralized body dictates the
connections between nodes,219 and self-organizing networks,
where individual nodes make their own choices about
connections.220 The federal government is an active player in
establishing and maintaining interstate linkages, though its
power is circumscribed by legal and political limitations. This
makes it hard to use a centralized legal approach to impose
an overall architecture on the system: the federal
government has some power to “nudge” the experimental
system towards exploration or exploitation, but the system’s
connections are subject to decisions made by thousands of
independent actors operating at the sub-federal level that
may or may not choose to cooperate.221
Second, the connections are dynamic—ties between
states change based on political forces, and their strength can
vary over time and on an issue-by-issue basis.222 Even if
certain states do not normally communicate with one
another, information and policies can spread across state
borders quite rapidly when attention to a particular issue
becomes nationalized, like same-sex marriage or medical
marijuana.223 This makes it particularly difficult to think
about the exploration-exploitation balance in a uniform, onesize-fits-all way, because at any given time, the system’s
behavior may vary depending upon the issue and political
dynamics.224
Third, connections between states are often outside the
control of state governments. Private, non-governmental
actors like political parties, interest groups, and policy
219. See Graeme Boushey, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and the Diffusion of
Innovations, 40 POL’Y STUD. J. 127, 130 (2012) [hereinafter Boushey, Punctuated
Equilibrium Theory] (listing studies showing influence of federal mandates,
grants, and agenda setting on state policy adoption).
220. See Bednar, Subsidiarity and Robustness, supra note 21, at 247-49.
221. See Bednar, Nudging Federalism, supra note 10, at 512; Bednar,
Subsidiarity and Robustness, supra note 21, at 242-43.
222. See KARCH, supra note 6, at 196-97.
223. Boushey, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, supra note 219, at 132, 142.
224. Id. at 142; Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 116.
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entrepreneurs are the primary providers of interstate
linkages, facilitating the transfer of information about policy
experiments across state borders and coordinating multistate political efforts at policy innovation.225 Any efforts to
“nudge” the exploration-exploitation balance through the
creation or removal of links between nodes requires the
cooperation of diverse and powerful political forces beyond
the control of any central authority.
These realities make it difficult to be prescriptive about
the ideal network architecture for experimental federalism,
and this Article will not try. But it is possible to examine how
interdependence affects the system’s experimental bias
towards exploration or exploitation in order to better
understand the system’s overall behavior.226
C. Strong Ties vs. Weak Ties
When
systems
lack
centralized
direction,
interdependence among the system’s components exerts a
powerful influence on how the system behaves. In particular,
interdependence and network ties can nudge a system’s
experimental behavior towards either exploitation or
exploration.227
Network theorists emphasize the difference between
“strong” and “weak” ties between nodes.228 In “strong tie” or
dense networks, nodes maintain connections to a large
number of other nodes in the network. Information flows
quickly and directly, and the ability to gather and aggregate
information is democratically dispersed throughout the
system.229 These networks gather a lot of immediate feedback
225. See BOUSHEY, POLICY DIFFUSION, supra note 116, at 29-30; Amanda C.
Leiter, Fracking as a Federalism Case Study, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1123, 1126-29
(2014); Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation,
41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 738, 739-41, 765 (1997).
226. See David Lazer & Allan Friedman, The Network Structure of Exploration
and Exploitation, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 667 (2007).
227. See id.
228. See, e.g., Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC.
1360 (1973).
229. See Phelps et al., supra note 191, at 1124.
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about different choices and can prove very robust in the face
of change by creating redundancies among nodes in the
network, like a power grid that can find many different ways
to provide electricity when a single connection goes down. 230
By contrast, “weak tie” networks have a limited number of
connections between nodes. Information spreads more slowly
and less efficiently, as each node is limited in its ability to
send and receive information.
From an exploration/exploitation perspective, strong ties
push systems towards exploitation-based strategies,
convergence, coordination, and homogeneity.231 As one node
arrives at a best-available solution, “strong ties” make it easy
for other nodes to learn about it and rapidly converge on that
solution.232 For example, in a federalism context, strong
informational ties between states can facilitate policy
diffusion, a well-documented phenomenon where policy
innovations spread from state to state.233
Weak ties, on the other hand, tend to push the system
towards exploration-based approaches, heterogeneity, and
divergence.234 When connections among nodes are weak,
information about other experiments is limited and nonsequential, which can make it more difficult to determine if
other nodes have found better solutions.235 As a result, nodes
in “weak tie” networks tend to move towards developing their
own innovations rather than looking to solutions produced by
other nodes.236 Moreover, maintaining weak ties or distance
among nodes allows the system to preserve diverse
approaches to problem solving over a longer period of time.237
This can prove helpful for difficult problems, where it may
take time to determine the best available solution. For
example, a federalist system with a critical mass of isolated
230. See Bednar, Subsidiarity & Robustness, supra note 21, at 235.
231. See Phelps et al., supra note 191, at 1128, 1133.
232. See Lazer, Information and Innovation, supra note 97, at 60, 61, 64.
233. See sources cited supra note 62 and accompanying text.
234. See Lazer, Information and Innovation, supra note 97, at 61.
235. See id.
236. Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 107, at 61.
237. See Fang et al., supra note 201, at 627.
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or slow-learning states might actually end up improving its
overall performance due to its ability to prevent premature
convergence and maintain diverse approaches to problem
solving over a longer period of time.238
D. Interdependence and Information Deficits
Within federalist systems, the relationship between
interdependence and the exploitation-exploration continuum
can have real implications for policy initiatives designed to
improve experimental outputs and innovation. For example,
consider how changing interdependencies might affect the
problem of information deficits in state policy
experimentation.
Information flow is often described as a necessary
prerequisite for policy experimentation.239 In order to make
good choices about policy design, state officials need
information about what other states are doing and the
effectiveness of available alternatives. Yet, for different
reasons, including concerns about free-riding and inadequate
incentives, states often do not produce sufficient or accurate
information about their experiments, or will fail to seek out
information about existing experiments in other states. 240
This leaves state policy makers with an incomplete picture of
the available policy options, and limits federalism’s capacity
to locate and disseminate the most successful policy
experiments.
In order to correct for information deficits, several
federalism scholars have called for the federal government to
operate as a clearinghouse or “information portal” for state
policy experimentation, standardizing the kinds of
information that states share and facilitating the production,
distribution, and comparison of information about different
policy approaches.241 This would effectively strengthen ties
238. See id.
239. See Stephenson, supra note 79, at 1423-27; Wiseman, supra note 15, at
1679-81.
240. See Wiseman, supra note 15.
241. See id.; see also Burger, supra note 62; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2.
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within the experimental network by turning the federal
government into an information “hub,” and change the
existing interdependence dynamics within the system. 242
While there are certainly some experimental benefits to
facilitating greater interstate communication through the
creation of stronger ties,243 complexity theory raises some
potential concerns about how creating greater state-level
information interdependence through federal intervention
would affect the system’s overall experimental behavior.
When a network creates more or stronger ties between
nodes, the system’s overall innovation strategy tilts towards
exploitation. When making decisions, nodes within a wellconnected system can become increasingly reliant on already
available information and allocate fewer resources to new
experiments and innovation. Informational interdependence,
whether created by the states themselves, facilitated by
interest groups, or imposed by the federal government, can
actually lead to less overall experimentation as states design
experiments with the information that is closest to them and
stop seeking out untested frontiers.
Increased informational interdependence can also limit
the system’s ability to realize the experimental benefits of
diversity.244 Systems that adopt an exploitation-based
strategy tend to become more homogenous due to selfreinforcing feedback mechanisms that become even stronger
the more the system relies upon the same set of information.
As a result, strong-tie networks risk premature convergence
around short-term solutions that may prove sub-optimal in
the long-term,245 or solutions based on bad or inaccurate

242. See generally Melissa A. Schilling & Christina Fang, When Hubs Forget, Lie,
and Play Favorites: Interpersonal Network Structure, Information Distortion, and
Organizational Learning, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 974 (2014).
243. This assumes that states are actually responsive to the information they
receive about policies adopted in other states. Shipan & Volden, The Mechanisms
of Policy Diffusion, supra note 62, at 840. But see KARCH, supra note 6, at 105-07,
109, 111.
244. See Lazer & Friedman, supra note 226, at 686.
245. See id. at 678-80.

2015] COMPLEX EXPERIMENTAL FEDERALISM

293

information that flows quickly through the system. 246
Moreover, by making it easier and cheaper for a state to
obtain information about other states’ experiments in a
homogeneous environment, the risk of free-riding increases
significantly.247
Finally, even within strong tie networks, nodes are
selective about who they choose to listen to: just because the
federal government invests in the production and
dissemination of information does not mean that states will
actually use it. In particular, states pay more attention to
information from places that are similar to them. This
phenomenon, known in network theory as “homophily,” 248
places constraints on the ability of strong tie or hub networks
to convey information, and there is significant evidence to
suggest that interstate ties are homophilous. 249 States that
share certain core traits, like ideological and partisan
preferences, are more likely to learn from each others’
policies.250 While creating information hubs may indeed
result in cross-pollination of ideas outside of these subgroups,251 homophilous links forged from the “bottom up” by
the nodes themselves may in practice prove to be immune to
the ideas promoted by a centralized information network
imposed from the top down.252 This is of particular concern in
a polarized political environment where states may be
particularly inclined to discount good information based on
the partisan affiliations of its source, and more likely to
prioritize information from states with similar political
views.
246. See Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 107, at 62; see also Deborah
E. Gibbons, Network Structure and Innovation Ambiguity Effects on Diffusion in
Dynamic Organizational Fields, 47 ACAD. MGMT. J. 938 (2004).
247. See Galle & Leahy, supra note 62.
248. See Adam M. Kleinbaum et al., Discretion Within Constraint: Homophily
and Structure in a Formal Organization, 24 ORG. SCI. 1316, 1316 (2013).
249. Homophily has been found in a wide variety of relationship types and in
different context. See id. at 1317.
250. Lawrence J. Grossback et al., Ideology and Learning in Policy Diffusion, 32
AM. POL. RES. 521 (2004).
251. See ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARÁBASI, LINKED 64 (2014).
252. But see Boushey, Punctuated Equilibrium, supra note 219, at 142 (arguing
that federally mandated innovation causes rapid policy diffusion).
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This does not mean that information sharing within a
network is a bad thing or that there is no role for the federal
government to play in incentivizing or structuring state
policy experimentation. It only suggests that informational
interdependence can alter a system’s behavior in ways that
can advance as well as diminish its experimental
performance. When links between states move a system too
far towards exploitation or affect the system’s overall level of
heterogeneity, limits on information sharing may actually
help the system produce more and better policy experiments.
CONCLUSION
Complexity reminds us that policy devolution does not,
in and of itself, necessarily result in more or better
experimentation. Regardless of how authority is divided
between federal and state governments,253 effective
experimentation is often contingent on heterogeneity and
interdependence among the state policy laboratories.
Heterogeneity helps experimental systems overcome certain
obstacles to effective problem solving, while simultaneously
creating other difficulties. Interdependence helps influence
whether a system adopts an experimental approach that
emphasizes exploitation or exploration, along with all the
attendant costs and benefits.
The recognition of heterogeneity and interdependence as
critical variables for federalism’s experimental performance
has implications for constitutional theory beyond deepening
our knowledge of how the system works. First, it suggests the
need to move away from a continual focus on federal-state
253. For research addressing how decisions about centralization and
decentralization affect policy experimentation, see, e.g., John C. Butler & Jovan
Grahovac, Learning, Imitation, and the Use of Knowledge: A Comparison of
Markets, Hierarchies, and Teams, 23 ORG. SCI. 1249 (2012); Kollman et al.,
Decentralization, supra note 142; Nicolaj Siggelkow & Daniel A. Leventhal,
Temporarily Divide to Conquer: Centralized, Decentralized, and Reintegrated
Organizational Approaches to Exploration and Adaptation, 14 ORG. SCI. 650
(2003); Nicolaj Siggelkow & Jan W. Rivkin, Speed and Search: Designing
Organizations for Turbulence and Complexity, 16 ORG. SCI. 101 (2005); Nicolaj
Siggelkow & Jan W. Rivkin, When Exploration Backfires: Unintended
Consequences of Multilevel Organizational Search, 49 ACAD. MGMT. J. 779 (2006);
Koleman S. Strumpf, Does Government Decentralization Increase Policy
Innovation?, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 207 (2002).
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interactions and boundaries. Experimental federalism needs
a fuller account of the political dynamics that drive policy
decisions at the state level, the nature of interstate
interactions and relationships, the forces that drive states
closer together or further apart, and the ways that
constitutional doctrine nudges state-level political behavior
to become more uniform, polarized, or diverse.
Second, it underscores how difficult it is to be
prescriptive about using law to improve federalism’s
experimental outcomes. By their very nature, complexity and
emergence can make it difficult to identify causal
relationships within the system and to fully anticipate the
effects of legal or institutional reform.254 Moreover, if
systemic heterogeneity and interdependence are primarily a
function of politics, law may prove quite limited in its ability
to alter the well-established behavior of powerful political
forces that drive the experimental system.
Finally, complexity suggests a broader vision of
experimental federalism’s normative goal. Complex adaptive
systems achieve a competitive advantage over more
hierarchical structures through their ability to survive and
adapt in the face of change. When it works, experimental
federalism allows the system to simultaneously explore and
exploit at the same time, and to seek out the optimal spot on
the continuum between rigidity and randomness. The
ultimate goal of experimental federalism is not just improved
policy through innovation, but a system that can survive and
thrive in a dynamic and changing world.

254. See PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 20, at 31-33; J.B. Ruhl &
Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal Complexity,
100 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2566535.

